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The graduating class of 2015 is estimated to have a total education 
debt—including federal and private education loans—of 
approximately $68 billion.1 Almost 71% of the 2015 graduating class 
graduated with some form of student loan debt.2 It seems like a major 
news outlet runs a student loan story every week.3 With indebtedness 
rising, and a stagnant wage market, many students will struggle to pay 
off their loans.4 Homeownership rates have plummeted, the birth rate 
                                                 
* J.D. candidate, May 2016, Chicago- Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology.  
1 Jeffrey Sparshott, Congratulations, Class of 2015. You’re the Most Indebted 
Ever (For Now), WALL ST. J. (May 8, 2015, 7:59 AM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2015/05/08/congratulations-class-of-2015-youre-
the-most-indebted-ever-for-now/. 
2 Id.  
3 See, e.g., Kevin Carey, Repayment Rates Show New Depths for Student Loan 
Debt, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2015, at A3; Gail MarksJarvis, Illinois College Students 
Feeling Loan Pain, CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 27, 2015), http://www.chicagotribune.com/ct-
student-loan-debt-1028-biz-20151027-story.html. 
4 See Lawrence Mishel, Pay Is Stagnant for Vast Majority, Even When You 
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is declining, and default rates are rising—all can be attributed to the 
indebtedness of twenty-somethings.5 Some of these debtors will 
unquestionably be forced into bankruptcy.  
Generally, student loans cannot be discharged through 
bankruptcy.6 However, there is an exception in the bankruptcy code 
that allows debtors to discharge their student loans if they can prove 
that maintaining their student loan debts will impose an “undue 
hardship” on the debtor.7 Congress did not define what exactly undue 
hardship meant when drafting the bankruptcy code, so the burden of 
defining this provision has fallen on the bankruptcy courts.8 This 
Comment aims to explain the context of the undue hardship definition, 
and apply that definition in light of the Seventh Circuit’s recent 
opinion in Tetzlaff v. Educational Credit Management Corp.9  
This Comment will: first, describe the genesis and the various 
definitions of “undue hardship” that the circuit courts currently apply; 
second, consider, through hypotheticals, whether the differences 
between the circuits’ definitions create an outcome determinative 
circuit split; third, explain the facts at issue in Tetzlaff, the holding, and 
explain where the law regarding discharging student loans through 
bankruptcy in the Seventh Circuit rests; and fourth, conclude that the 
Seventh Circuit’s application is no longer consistent with the 
bankruptcy code, and call for legislative action. Ultimately, the 
Seventh Circuit no longer properly assesses undue hardship—the 
definition and application has now evolved into a test that is more 
difficult to pass than the already-exacting language of “undue 
hardship.” 
 
                                                 
5 See Kelley Holland, The High Economic and Social Costs of Student Loan 
Debt, CNBC ONLINE (June 15, 2015), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/06/15/the-high-
economic-and-social-costs-of-student-loan-debt.html. 
6 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(8) (West, Westlaw current through Pub. L. No. 114-
119). 
7 Id.  
8 See H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137, pt. II, at 140 (1973). 
9 Tetzlaff v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (Tetzlaff II), 794 F. 3d 756 (7th Cir. 
2015). 
2
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 2
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol11/iss2/2
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                       Volume 11, Issue 2                        Spring 2016 
 
118 
Background - What Does “Undue Hardship” Mean? 
 
The United States bankruptcy system as a whole is designed to 
relieve the honest debtor from the “burden of hopeless insolvency.”10 
In other words, bankruptcy can help achieve a “fresh start” for the 
debtor.11 Today, in the context of student loans, a debtor can receive a 
full or partial discharge of federal student loans through bankruptcy if 
the debtor can show that repaying the debt creates an “undue 
hardship” on the debtor and his or her dependents.12 This undue 
hardship adversary proceeding looks very much like a civil bench 
trial.13 The debtor presents evidence in front of a bankruptcy court, 
and the credit company contests the evidence presented.14 Appeals are 
heard at the United States District Court level, and further appeals 
move up the federal appellate chain.15 To date, the Supreme Court has 
not heard an appeal stemming from an undue hardship adversary 
proceeding. This section of the Comment will focus on the legislative 
history behind “undue hardship,” the various applications of the undue 
hardship definitions in the courts, and will conclude that these 
differences in definitions can, in rare circumstances, create outcome 
determinative results. 
 
A. Legislative History  
 
Congress originally enacted section 523(a)(8) in 1978.16 The 
statute was enacted in response to the growing concern that college 
students would receive federal loans for their education and then 
                                                 
10 Neal v. Clark, 95 U.S. 704, 709 (1877). 
11 See H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 133-34 (1977). 
12 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(8) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-119). 
13 Douglas G. Baird, Edward R. Morrison, Adversary Proceedings In 
Bankruptcy: A Sideshow, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 951, 951 (2005).  
14 FED. R. BANKR. P. 9017; FED. R. CIV. P. 43, 44.  
15 FED. R. BANKR. P. 8003. 
16 See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 
(1978) (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (1994)). 
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discharge those loans through bankruptcy as soon as they could after 
graduation.17 For example, a New Jersey resident filed for bankruptcy 
fourteen days after graduating from Stanford Law School.18 He had 
already earned a business degree and a master’s degree in engineering, 
and he filed for bankruptcy for the sole purpose of having his loans 
discharged.19 Another instance involved a Massachusetts couple; the 
husband held a law degree, the wife held a graduate degree, and both 
had a total of $20,000 worth of student loans discharged immediately 
after graduation.20 Stories like these received widespread media 
attention and prompted congress into action.21  
At first, section 523(a)(8) provided that student loans were 
nondischargeable unless five years had passed since the loan first 
became due, or if an undue hardship would arise if the student was 
forced to repay the loan.22 This five-year provision was subsequently 
changed to seven years in 1990 for very much the same reasons it was 
instituted in the first place.23 Due to concern over potential debtor 
abuse, the seven-year provision was abolished in 1998.24 The only 
option for debtors to potentially discharge their federal student loan 
debt is now to show undue hardship.25 
                                                 
17 See H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137, pt. II, at 140 (1973). 
18 See Bankruptcy Act Revision: Hearings on H.R. 31 and H.R. 32 Before the 
S. Comm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th 
Cong. 1078 (1976) (statement of Hon. Edward York, U.S. Deputy Commissioner, 
U.S. Office of Education). 
19 Id.  
20 Jennifer L. Frattini, Note & Comment, The Dischargeability of Student 
Loans: An Undue Burden, 17 BANKR. DEV. J. 537, 542 (2001). 
21 Id. 
22 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) 
(codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (1994)). 
23 Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4789 (1990) 
(codified as amended at 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(8) (West, Westlaw through PL 101–
647) (extending the period of nondischargeability from five to seven years). 
24 See Higher Education Amendments of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-244, § 971, 
112 Stat. 1581, 1837 (1998) (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (1999)). 
25 In re Kuehn, 563 F.3d 289, 294 (7th Cir. 2009). 
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B. How Courts Define Undue Hardship 
 
The United States Constitution requires uniform federal 
bankruptcy laws applied throughout the states.26 In theory, this 
uniformity requires debtors to be treated alike regardless of which 
bankruptcy court they appear in; however, in practice, when congress 
has remained silent in defining certain provisions of the bankruptcy 
code, different courts will interpret the provisions in different ways.27 
Here, for example, congress failed to define “undue hardship,” and 
failed to provide any suggestion to courts on how to interpret that 
language.28 Because there is no legislative definition of “undue 
hardship,” various circuit courts define the term in different ways. For 
example, numerous circuit courts examine undue hardship with the 
Brunner test, a three-prong test that examines if: (1) the debtor cannot 
maintain, based on current income and expenses, a minimal standard 
of living for herself and her dependents if forced to repay the loans; 
(2) additional circumstances exist indicating that this state of affairs is 
likely to persist for a significant portion of the repayment period of the 
student loans; and (3) the debtor has made good faith efforts to repay 
the loans.29 Conversely, the Eighth Circuit uses a totality of the 
circumstances test.30  
 
1. The Brunner Three-Prong Definition 
 
The seminal undue hardship case is Brunner v. New York State 
Higher Education Services Corp. out of the Second Circuit. In 
                                                 
26 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
27 See Vanston Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S. 156, 172-73 
(1946). 
28 See Fox v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency, 163 B.R 975, 978 (Bankr. 
M.D. Pa. 1993) (“It’s troubling that Congress did not see fit to define the term 
‘undue hardship’ in drafting the Bankruptcy Code.”). 
29 Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp., 831 F.2d 395, 396 (2d Cir. 
1987). 
30 Long v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., 322 F.3d 549, 554 (2d Cir. 2003). 
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Brunner, the debtor received a Bachelor of Arts degree in 1979 and a 
Master’s degree in social work in 1982.31 Approximately nine months 
after receiving her master’s degree, the debtor filed to discharge her 
approximately $9,000 in student loans through bankruptcy.32 After a 
brief oral hearing where the debtor described her “shaky finances” and 
her unsuccessful attempt to find work, her loans were successfully 
discharged.33 On appeal, the district court took a harder look at the 
debtor’s actual ability to pay off her loans.34 Her greatest annual 
income was $9,000 in the decade prior to the hearing. At the time of 
the hearing, she was receiving $258 in public assistance, $49 per 
month in food stamps, and Medicaid.35 Her rent was $200 per 
month.36 The debtor further testified that she had sent out over a 
hundred resumes in search of employment, but was unsuccessful.37 
The district court reversed the bankruptcy court—holding that while 
the debtor might have proved a current inability to pay off her loans, 
she did not show that she could not pay off her loans in the future, nor 
did she show that she had even tried to pay off her loans.38 This 
rationale was the foundation for the Brunner test. 
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
judgment.39 The Second Circuit further made the district court’s 
holding into a three-pronged rule to determine undue hardship.40 First, 
the debtor must show that she cannot maintain, based on current 
income and expenses, a minimal standard of living for herself and her 
                                                 
31 In re Brunner, 46 B.R. 752, 753 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
32 Brunner, 46 B.R. at 753. 
33 Id.   
34 See id. at 756.  
35 Id. at 757.  
36 Id.   
37 Id.  
38 Id. at 757-58. 
39 Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp., 831 F.2d 395, 396 (2d Cir. 
1987). 
40 Id.  
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dependents if forced to repay the loans.41 This first prong has been 
applied as the bare minimum necessary to establish undue hardship.42 
Second, the debtor must show that additional circumstances exist 
indicating that the debtor’s state of affairs is likely to persist for a 
significant portion of the repayment period of the student loans.43 The 
Second Circuit justified this second prong because of the “clear 
congressional intent exhibited in section 523(a)(8) to make the 
discharge of student loans more difficult than that of other 
nonexcepted debt.”44 Basically, proving a continuing inability to pay 
in the future is more likely to show that the hardship presented is 
undue.45 Third, the debtor must show that she made good faith efforts 
to repay the loans.46 This requirement was necessary for the Second 
Circuit to deter recent graduates from attempting to discharge their 
loans while looking for work, like the debtor in Brunner, and instead 
promote recent graduates unable to find work to request a deferment 
of payments on the loans.47 
 
2. The Totality of the Circumstances Definition 
 
The Eighth Circuit decision of Long v. Educational Credit 
Management Corp. articulates the totality of the circumstances 
definition.48 In Long, the debtor was a thirty-nine-year-old single 
mother.49 She obtained her chiropractic degree by taking out 
substantial student loans.50 She passed her state exam, worked at 
various clinics, and eventually owned and operated her own practice 
                                                 






47 See id. at 397.  
48 Long v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., 322 F.3d 549 (8th Cir. 2003).  
49 Id. at 551.  
50 Id. 
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up until her mental circumstances changed.51 She began to experience 
extreme fatigue, depression, and severe short-term memory loss.52 
These symptoms affected her work; her clientele dropped, and she 
eventually closed her practice down altogether.53 At one point in her 
downward spiral, she attempted suicide.54 After seeking professional 
help, she fortunately began a recovery process.55 
At the time of the bankruptcy proceeding, the debtor in Long was 
making approximately $1,163 per month.56 She lived at home with her 
parents and paid them $500-$600 per month in return for them to 
subsidize her and her child’s rent, utilities, car payment, car insurance, 
health insurance, cellular phone bill, child care, and food.57 The 
remainder of her income went to her loans, and her pursuit of a four-
year degree to get back on her feet.58 At the time of the bankruptcy 
proceeding, the debtor’s $35,322.81 in student loans had increased to 
over $61,000.59 The bankruptcy court granted the debtor an undue 
hardship discharge because loan repayment would essentially impose a 
twenty-five-year sentence in payments on an obligation that she could 
never realistically expect to retire or reduce.60 
On appeal, the creditor urged the Eighth Circuit to adopt the 
Brunner test.61 The main reason behind this request was because the 
debtor made approximately ten years’ of payments towards her debt, 
but defaulted after she became ill.62 If Brunner were to apply, she 
would not be able to discharge her loans since she would not meet the 




54 Id.  
55 Id.  
56 Id.   
57 Id. at 551-52. 
58 Id. at 552. 
59 Id.  
60 Id.  
61 Id. at 553.  
62 Id. at 552. 
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third prong of the test—the good faith prong. The Eighth Circuit was 
not persuaded, however, because it specifically declined to apply 
Brunner.63 The Eighth Circuit took issue with the fact that “under a 
Brunner analysis, if the bankruptcy court finds against the debtor on 
any of the three prongs of the test, the inquiry ends and the student 
loan is not dischargeable.”64 
The Eighth Circuit finally held that it preferred a “less restrictive 
approach” in defining undue hardship and decided that the totality-of-
the-circumstances approach was best.65 The Eighth Circuit stated, 
“that fairness and equity require each undue hardship case to be 
examined on the unique facts and circumstances that surround the 
particular bankruptcy.”66 The court further held that the totality of the 
circumstances analysis considers: “(1) the debtor’s past, present, and 
reasonably reliable future financial resources; (2) a calculation of the 
debtor’s and her dependent’s reasonable necessary living expenses; 
and (3) any other relevant facts and circumstances surrounding each 
bankruptcy case.”67 The Eighth Circuit believes in the simple premise 
that “if the debtor’s reasonable future financial resources will 
sufficiently cover payment of the student loan debt—while still 
allowing for a minimal standard of living—then the debt should not be 
discharged.”68 
 
3. How Other Circuits Define “Undue Hardship” 
 
Unlike the Eighth Circuit, the majority of other circuit courts 
examine undue hardship using the Brunner test.69 The Third, Fourth, 
Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits all have 
                                                 
63 Id. at 553.  
64 Id., at 554. 
65 Id.  
66 Id.  
67 Id.  
68 Id. at 554-555.  
69 In re Hicks, 331 B.R. 18, 30 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2005). 
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adopted some version of this Brunner three-prong test.70 The First 
Circuit has declined to choose a specific test.71 The eight circuits that 
have adopted Brunner all seem to have different formulations of how 
these three general prongs are specifically defined. The courts agree on 
uniformly applying the first prong of Brunner—the debtor must show 
an inability to pay off the loans while still maintaining a minimal 
standard of living and while attempting to maximize income—but the 
application of the other two prongs has generated confusion. 72 
Courts have differed on how to properly assess whether a debtor 
will likely have the same circumstances through most of the loan 
repayment period. The Seventh Circuit, along with three other circuits, 
has defined the second prong of Brunner to require that the debtor 
show a “certainty of hopelessness” before being allowed to discharge 
his/her loans.73 In these circuits, a present inability to fulfill financial 
commitments is not enough for the second prong to be satisfied.74 
While no circuit has defined what this “certainty of hopelessness” 
truly means, the Fourth and Sixth Circuits have indicated that the 
debtor can demonstrate a certainty of hopelessness through “illness, 
disability, a lack of useable job skills, or the existence of a large 
number of dependents.”75 In the Sixth Circuit, proving the second 
prong of Brunner requires a showing of “hopelessness” that is outside 
of the debtor’s control, and showing that these circumstances will 
                                                 
70 Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Frushour (In re Frushour), 433 F.3d 393, 400 
(4th Cir. 2005); Oyler v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Oyler), 397 F.3d 382, 385 
(6th Cir. 2005); Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Polleys, 356 F.3d 1302, 1309 (10th 
Cir. 2004); U.S. Dep’t of Educ. v. Gerhardt (In re Gerhardt), 348 F.3d 89, 91 (5th 
Cir. 2003); Hemar Ins. Corp. of Am. v. Cox, 338 F.3d 1238, 1241 (11th Cir. 2003); 
Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency v. Faish (In re Faish), 72 F.3d 298, 306 (3d Cir. 
1995); In re Roberson, 999 F.2d 1132, 1135 (7th Cir. 1993). 
71 In re Nash, 446 F.3d 188, 190 (1st Cir. 2006). 
72 See In re Bronsdon, 435 B.R. 791, 806 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2010). 
73 Oyler, 397 F.3d at 386; Frushour, 433 F.3d at 396; O’Hearn v. Educ. Credit 
Mgmt. Corp. (In re O’Hearn), 339 F.3d 559, 564 (7th Cir. 2003); Faish, 72 F.3d at 
307. 
74 O’Hearn, 339 F.3d at 564.  
75 Frushour, 433 F.3d at 400; Oyler, 397 F.3d at 386. 
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continue to be hopeless for some period of time.76 The Third Circuit 
defined certainty of hopelessness as “total incapacity now and in the 
future to pay [her] debts for reasons not within her control.”77 The 
Fifth Circuit has not adopted the certainty of hopelessness standard, 
but it has nonetheless defined this prong of the Brunner test to require 
proving “total incapacity,” similar to the Third Circuit’s definition.78  
On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit does not require that 
certainty of hopelessness must be proven when evaluating “future 
hardship.”79 The Tenth Circuit has explicitly rejected a certainty of 
hopelessness standard, instead requiring courts to take a “realistic 
look” at the debtor’s ability to “provide for adequate shelter, nutrition, 
health care, and the like”.”80 These two Brunner-applying circuits 
have a more lenient approach to the second prong of Brunner than the 
certainty of hopelessness circuits. 
Courts disagree on the third prong of Brunner as well. Some 
courts have held that the failure to make any past payments on the 
precise student loan debt sought to be discharged is a per se bar to 
discharge because it does not meet the “good faith” requirement.81 In 
contrast, the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have explicitly held that the 
failure to make student loan payments does not, standing alone, 
preclude a finding of prior good faith effort.82 These circuits view the 
good faith requirement as one that evaluates whether the debtor was 
attempting to abuse the student loan system—rather than one that 
                                                 
76 Oyler, 397 F.3d at 386. 
77 Faish, 72 F.3d at 307. 
78 Gerhardt, 348 F.3d at 92 (quoting Faish, 72 F.3d at 307). 
79 Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Mason (In re Mason), 464 F.3d 878, 882-83 
(9th Cir. 2006) (holding that a debtor does not have a “separate burden” to show 
exceptional circumstances beyond the inability to pay presently or in the future). 
80 Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Polleys, 356 F.3d 1302, 1310 (10th Cir. 2004). 
81 Lehman v. N.Y. Higher Educ. Servs. Corp., 226 B.R. 805, 808-09 (Bankr. 
D. Vt. 1998). 
82 See In re Mosley, 494 F.3d 1320, 1327 (11th Cir. 2007); Polleys, 356 F.3d at 
1310. 
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evaluates whether the debtor was aggressively paying off the student 
loans under the circumstances.83  
 
C. Are These Definitions Outcome Determinative? 
 
Despite the different verbal formulations, both the Brunner test 
and the “totality-of-the-circumstances” test use similar information 
and typically will lead to similar results. As the Tenth Circuit put it, 
“the two tests will often consider similar information—the debtor’s 
current and prospective financial situation in relation to the 
educational debt and the debtor’s efforts at repayment.”84 The choice 
of “test” makes so little difference that the First Circuit refused even to 
choose between the two.85 
Other circuit courts agree with the First Circuit. For instance, 
while adopting the Brunner test, the Tenth Circuit rejected arguments 
that the two tests diverged: “We do not read Brunner to rule out 
consideration of all the facts and circumstances. . . . [Brunner] 
necessarily entails an analysis of all relevant factors, including the 
health of the debtor and any of his dependents and the debtor’s 
education and skill level.”86 Even the Eighth Circuit, the circuit known 
for applying the totality-of-the-circumstances test, acknowledged that 
whatever conflict exists between the two tests “may not be that 
significant.”87 And this makes sense; both tests are designed to define 
“undue hardship,” after all. This section of the Comment will explain, 
through a hypothetical, how the Brunner and totality tests can be 
outcome determinative. This section will further explain how the 
different formulations of Brunner within the circuits look like they 
                                                 
83 Polleys, 356 F.3d at 1312.  
84 Id. at 1309. 
85 In re Nash, 446 F.3d 188, 190 (1st Cir. 2006) (“We see no need in this case 
to pronounce our views of a preferred method of identifying a case of ‘undue 
hardship.’”). 
86 Polleys, 356 F.3d at 1309. 
87 Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Jesperson, 571 F.3d 775, 779 n.1 (8th Cir. 
2009). 
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may produce different results, but do not actually do so when 
employed. 
 
1. Brunner vs. Totality Tests 
 
Even though both tests evaluate similar facts, there is no question 
that a debtor who fails to satisfy any single element of Brunner is 
automatically ineligible for discharge.88 By contrast, courts applying 
the totality test simply ask the statutory question whether there is 
“undue hardship.”89 These courts consider a broad range of factors, 
with no single dispositive consideration.90 The “totality” approach 
rejects “strict parameters,” allowing courts to exercise “the inherent 
discretion contained in § 523(a)(8)(B).”91 
While, in many cases, both tests lead to the same result, the legal 
profession recognizes that there can be significant differences between 
the two tests. The “totality” test is “more flexible and often more 
beneficial to the debtor.’’92 “The two tests often produce different 
results’’ because of the compulsory-checklist nature of the Brunner 
test.93 In many cases the Brunner test results in no discharge where 
‘‘the likelihood of discharge would have been vastly improved’’ in a 
‘‘totality’’ jurisdiction.94  
                                                 
88 See Brunner v. N.Y. Higher Educ. Servs. Corp., 831 F.2d 395, 396 (2d Cir. 
1987). 
89 See e.g., Long v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Long), 322 F.3d 549, 554-
55 (8th Cir. 2003). 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 554. 
92 Adam J. Williams, Note, Fixing the ‘‘Undue Hardship’’ Hardship: Solutions 
For The Problem of Discharging Educational Loans Through Bankruptcy, 70 U. 
PITT. L. REV. 217, 228 (2008). 
93 Kurtis K. Wiard, Comment, Brunner’s Folly: The Road to Discharging 
Student Loans Is Paved with Unfounded Optimism [Buckland v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. 
Corp. (In re Buckland), 424 B.R. 883 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2010)], 52 WASHBURN L.J. 
357, 373 (2013). 
94 Adam Schlusselberg, Comment, In re Davis, 53 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 639, 
650 (2009). 
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One hypothetical can help show how these standards can be 
outcome determinative. Assume there is an individual, Deborah, 
whose debt is somewhat similar to the debtor in Long—she has an 
advanced degree, say, a Master’s in Education rather than Long’s 
chiropractic degree.95 But, Deborah cannot find full-time employment. 
Deborah has been searching for years; she has relocated cities just to 
look for jobs, but nothing is working out for her. She shares the 
cheapest apartment she can find with multiple roommates, she has not 
bought a new car, nor has she bought any extravagant items since 
receiving her diploma. She works as a part-time substitute teacher, 
works an additional part-time job, and is seeking employment in 
multiple job industries—but her efforts in securing employment are to 
no avail. Assume that she can spend only $100 of her monthly income 
on paying off her loans under her small salaries and high loans. Under 
these circumstances, she should be able to pass the first prong of the 
Brunner test.96 She has attempted to maximize her income while 
minimizing her expenses.  
Now, let’s assume that Deborah gets ill. She loses her vision. Her 
circumstances are not likely to improve, nor will she realistically be 
able to utilize her advanced degree in the future. She will certainly 
meet the second prong of Brunner— her prospective circumstances 
are so dire that she will likely not be able to pay off her loans.97 
Finally, assume that Deborah has both private and federal student 
loans, and she has only paid off part of her private loans because she 
has a higher interest rate on those loans. Further, let’s assume that she 
stopped payment on both her private and federal loans when she 
became ill. This is where the Brunner and totality tests are outcome 
determinative. Despite what clearly looks like “undue hardship,” 
Deborah may not be able to discharge her federal loans in a circuit 
applying the Brunner test because she did not pay off her federal loans 
                                                 
95 Long v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Long), 322 F.3d 549, 551 (8th Cir. 
2003). 
96 See Brunner v. N.Y. Higher Educ. Servs. Corp., 831 F.2d 395, 396 (2d Cir. 
1987). 
97 See id. 
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in “good faith.”98 Under a totality of circumstances jurisdiction, 
however, Deborah would likely be able to discharge her loans under 
the same fact pattern because a failure to satisfy one prong of Brunner 
is not dispositive.99 
While the Deborah analogy is severe and unlikely to occur often, 
if at all, it illustrates that the tests for undue hardship do not always 
work in the way that courts intend them to. Despite a debtor being in a 
hopeless situation, outside of her control, a court would still—strictly 
applying Brunner—conclude that she could not discharge her loans. 
 
2. Are There Splits Within The Brunner Definition? 
 
Brunner, in layman’s terms, held that someone could discharge 
their student loans through bankruptcy if they: (1) cannot repay their 
student loans based on their current circumstances; (2) will not be able 
to pay off their loans in the future based on prospective circumstances; 
and (3) have tried to pay off their loans.100 As discussed previously, 
the eight circuits that have adopted Brunner all seem to have different 
formulations of how to apply the latter two prongs. The courts seem to 
agree on uniformly applying the first prong of Brunner, but the other 
two prongs could potentially create more outcome determinative 
splits. 
Some circuits, under the “future hardship” prong of Brunner, 
require a showing of a “total incapacity” to pay the loans in the future; 
others require a showing of a “certainty of hopelessness;” while others 
simply require a “realistic look” at the debtor’s circumstances.101 
                                                 
98 See In re Spence, 541 F.3d 538, 545 (4th Cir. 2008) (holding that a debtor’s 
choice to repay some of her loans does not demonstrate a good faith effort to pay all 
of the loans held by a creditor). 
99 See Long, 332 F.3d at 554. 
100 See Brunner, 831 F.2d at 396. 
101 See O’Hearn v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re O’Hearn), 339 F.3d 559, 
564 (7th Cir. 2003) (requiring a showing of certainty of hopelessness); Pa. Higher 
Educ. Assistance Agency v. Faish (In re Faish), 72 F.3d 298, 307 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(requiring a showing of total incapacity); Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Polleys, 356 
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Despite the differences in language, the courts generally agree that 
student loans are mortgages on the future, so the debtor must prove 
that her future is so bleak as to warrant a discharge of the loans.102 
Typically, this is shown to bankruptcy courts through testimony that 
the debtor has: an illness, some disability, a lack of useable job skills, 
or the existence of a large number of dependents.103 Because of the 
inherent discretion given to bankruptcy courts in weighing the facts 
and testimony presented to them, it is tough to come up with a 
hypothetical that would guarantee an outcome determinative circuit 
split.  
Returning to the Deborah analogy, under the facts presented 
above—but also assuming she has attempted to pay her federal loans 
in good faith—she would be able to discharge her loans in any 
jurisdiction. Losing one’s eyesight due to circumstances outside the 
debtor’s control would meet any test adopted in the circuits. However, 
assuming that she did not fall ill, but was instead a single mother of 
two children; assuming that she had been fired and was looking for a 
steady job for five years while trying to make ends meet, the circuits 
would potentially disagree on whether the second prong of Brunner 
was satisfied. However, the disagreement would not be due to the test 
employed, but rather due to the discretion of the bankruptcy judge as 
to whether Deborah could definitely show that her situation was not 
likely to improve. 
The third prong of Brunner could create outcome determinative 
splits if a jurisdiction holds that the failure to make any past payments 
on the precise student loan debt sought to be discharged is a per se bar. 
While the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have explicitly held that the 
failure to make any student loan payments does not, standing alone, 
preclude a finding of prior good faith effort—no circuit court has held 
                                                                                                                   
F.3d 1302, 1310 (10th Cir. 2004) (requiring courts to take a realistic look at debtor’s 
ability to repay).  
102 See e.g., Polleys, 356 F.3d at 1311.  
103 See Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Frushour (In re Frushour), 433 F.3d 393, 
401 (4th Cir. 2005); Oyler v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Oyler), 397 F.3d 382, 
386 (6th Cir. 2005). 
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that the failure does create an absolute bar.104 In the cases where 
circuit courts have held that the good faith requirement is not met due 
to a debtor’s choice to pay some loans, but not others, the courts have 
also held that other prongs of Brunner were not satisfied.105 This is 
because the circuits agree that there can be circumstances where a 
debtor can be attempting to repay the loans in good faith, but simply 
cannot do so.106 To conclude, while the language used by the various 
circuits to define the Brunner test differs, the actual application is not 
outcome determinative because of the leeway the fact-finder is given 
to determine what testimony is persuasive. 
 
UNDUE HARDSHIP IN THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 
 
This section of the Comment focuses on the state of undue 
hardship in the Seventh Circuit specifically. The Seventh Circuit now 
employs one of the strictest standards for discharging student loans 




While the Seventh Circuit has evaluated numerous undue 
hardship appeals, two cases stood out more than others in the 
formulation of the Tetzlaff opinion: Matter of Roberson, and Krieger v. 
Educational Credit Management Corp.107 This section of the 
Comment explains both cases in light of how the holdings influenced 




                                                 
104 See In re Mosley, 494 F.3d 1320, 1327 (11th Cir. 2007); Polleys, 356 F.3d 
at 1311. 
105 See In re Spence, 541 F.3d 538, 545 (4th Cir. 2008); see also Tetzlaff v. 
Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (Tetzlaff II), 794 F. 3d 756, 761 (7th Cir. 2015). 
106 See e.g., Mosley, 494 F.3d at 1327.  
107 Tetzlaff II, 794 F.3d at 758-59. 
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The Seventh Circuit first adopted the Brunner standard in Matter 
of Roberson.108 Jerry Roberson, the debtor, was still paying off his 
student loans for his Bachelor of Science degree when his life began to 
fall apart in 1990.109 His marriage failed, he lost his job, and he was no 
longer able to pay his creditors.110 Later that year, he filed for 
bankruptcy and attempted to discharge his loans.111 The bankruptcy 
court determined that Roberson’s loans were not dischargeable; 
Roberson appealed, and the district court reversed the bankruptcy 
court’s decision and discharged the loans.112 The creditor, Student 
Assistance Commission filed an appeal.113 
The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court and adopted the 
Brunner three-prong test.114 The Seventh Circuit explained its choice 
behind adopting Brunner, stating that the three requirements 
effectively weed out debtors filing for bankruptcy to primarily avoid 
loan repayment.115 The court continued: 
 
The government is not twisting the arms of potential students. 
The decision of whether or not to borrow for a college 
education lies with the individual; absent an expression to the 
contrary, the government does not guarantee the student’s 
future financial success. If the leveraged investment of an 
education does not generate the return the borrower 
anticipated, the student, not the taxpayers, must accept the 
consequences of the decision to borrow.116 
                                                 
108 Matter of Roberson, 999 F.2d 1132, 1135 (7th Cir. 1993). 
109 Id. at 1134.  
110 Id. 
111 Id.  
112 Id.  
113 Id. 
114 Id. at 1135. 
115 Id. at 1136. 
116 Id. at 1137. 
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The Seventh Circuit reasoned that the first prong of Brunner—the 
minimal standard of living prong—was the proper starting point for 
the undue hardship inquiry because this information is generally 
concrete and readily obtainable.117 The court continued by reasoning 
that the second prong of Brunner—the debtor’s condition is likely to 
persist for a significant portion of the repayment period—is necessary 
because student loans are effectively mortgages on the debtor’s 
future.118 The court next reasoned that the third prong of Brunner—the 
good faith effort to repay loans—would be measured by the debtor’s 
efforts to obtain employment, maximize income, and minimize 
expenses.119 Finally, the Seventh Circuit held that the Brunner test 




In 2013, the Seventh Circuit revisited the standard set by 
Roberson in Krieger v. Educational Credit Management Corp.121 The 
bankruptcy court held that the debtor in Krieger had adequately 
proven undue hardship.122 The creditor appealed, and the district court 
reversed; holding that the debtor could have searched harder for work, 
and that she failed the good faith prong because she had not enrolled 
in a twenty-five-year payment program.123 The Seventh Circuit 
reversed the district court and remanded to reinstate the discharge 
issued by the bankruptcy judge.124 While this holding had more to do 
with the district court misapplying the standard of review—a clear 
                                                 
117 Id. at 1135. 
118 Id. at 1135-36. 
119 Id. at 1136. 
120 Id. at 1136; see O’Hearn v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re O’Hearn), 339 
F.3d 559, 564 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that the certainty of hopelessness requirement 
is part of the second prong of the Brunner test).  
121 Krieger v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., 713 F.3d 882, 883 (7th Cir. 2013). 
122 Id.  
123 Id. at 883-84. 
124 Id. at 885.  
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error standard for the factual findings of the bankruptcy judge—the 
Seventh Circuit further elaborated on the standard set in Roberson.125  
The Seventh Circuit first discussed the third prong of Roberson, 
and therefore Brunner.126 The court held that the good faith prong 
could not require a commitment to future efforts to repay—because 
that would create a situation where no educational loan could ever be 
discharged.127 As to the second prong of Brunner, the Seventh Circuit 
held that the debtor proved that her circumstances were likely to 
persist indefinitely.128 The court made specific note that the debtor—
had she signed up for a twenty-five-year repayment period—would 
realistically not be able to pay anything towards her loans, and interest 
would accrue, until her loans would be forgiven pursuant to the 
plan.129 The Seventh Circuit criticized the “certainty of hopelessness” 
language in dicta, but ultimately held that Krieger was a scenario 
where there truly was no hope without a discharge of the loans.130 
 
B. Facts of Tetzlaff 
 
Mark Warren Tetzlaff was fifty-four-years-old at the time he filed 
his bankruptcy and adversary complaint.131 His student loan debt was 
nearly $260,000 when he filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy in 2012.132 
Tetzlaff’s debt was guaranteed by Educational Credit Management 
Corporation.133 Tetzlaff also held $18,940 in private student loan debt 
                                                 
125 Id. at 884-85. 
126 Id. at 884.  
127 Id. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. at 884-85.  
130 Id. at 885 (“[Certainty of hopelessness] sounds more restrictive than the 
statutory ‘undue hardship,’ but at all events the bankruptcy judge found that 
Krieger’s situation is hopeless.”). 
131 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, Tetzlaff v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., 
136 S.Ct 803 (2016) (No. 15-485).  
132 Tetzlaff v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (Tetzlaff II), 794 F. 3d 756, 757 (7th 
Cir. 2015).  
133 Id. 
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and $75,776.37 in private non-student loan debt.134 The mix of federal 
and private student loans was used to pay for Tetzlaff’s graduate 
education at Marquette University, 1992-1994 (MBA received); 
DePaul University College of Law, 1994-1998 (no degree received); 
and Florida Coastal School of Law, 1999-2005 (JD received).135 
Tetzlaff also has a Master’s in Religion from Trinity International 
University, but those loans, if there are any, were not at issue in his 
bankruptcy case.136 
The original repayment period for Tetzlaff’s consolidated federal 
student loan debt was twenty years.137 Based on an interest rate of 
4.125 percent and an eight-year amortization schedule through 
retirement at age sixty-five, Tetzlaff would need approximately 
$38,107 of excess annual cash flow per year to repay just his 
consolidated federal student loan debt.138 
Tetzlaff currently resides in Waukesha, Wisconsin, with his 86-
year-old mother.139 They subsist together solely on his mother’s Social 
Security payments.140 Tetzlaff is divorced, currently unemployed, and 
has twice failed the bar exam.141 Prior to attending graduate school, 
Tetzlaff worked in the employee benefits industry, as a stockbroker, as 
an insurance salesman, and as a financial advisor.142 He has been 
unable to find work in these fields since completing law school.143 In 
addition, Tetzlaff is a recovering alcoholic and faces other challenges 
                                                 
134 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7, Tetzlaff, 136 S.Ct 803 (No. 15-485). 
135 Id. 
136 Brief in Opposition to Certiorari at 5, Tetzlaff, 136 S.Ct. 803 (No. 15-485). 
137 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7, Tetzlaff, 136 S.Ct. 803 (No. 15-485). 
138 Id. 
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that contribute to his difficulties in obtaining employment, including 
several misdemeanor convictions.144 
 
C. Procedural History 
 
On May 1, 2014, the bankruptcy court issued an order holding the 
loans nondischargeable.145 The bankruptcy court found that with 
Tetzlaff’s current income, he was unable to pay his student loan debt 
and maintain a minimum standard of living—the first Brunner prong 
was met.146 The court turned next to Brunner’s second prong, and 
concluded that Tetzlaff failed to meet it; he failed to establish that he 
would be unable to pay back his student loan debt in the future.147 In 
doing so, the bankruptcy court noted that although “the ‘certainty of 
hopelessness’ standard . . . was criticized in dicta in Krieger, it was not 
explicitly overruled.”148 The bankruptcy court then clarified that “even 
if the lesser standard were applicable to this case, Mr. Tetzlaff has not 
met this test.”149 
In analyzing Tetzlaff’s future ability to repay his student loans, the 
bankruptcy court’s conclusions were based on its credibility 
determinations of two competing experts, Dr. Ackerman (a forensic 
psychologist hired by the creditor) and Dr. Gurka (Tetzlaff’s treating 
psychologist).150 The court found Dr. Ackerman’s testimony more 
compelling as it was more complete and more current that Dr. 
Gurka’s.151 The court also noted that Dr. Ackerman tested forensically, 
not just clinically, and therefore her testimony was particularly 
                                                 
144 Tetzlaff v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (Tetzlaff II), 794 F. 3d 756, 758 (7th 
Cir. 2015). 
145 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at IV, Tetzlaff, 136 S.Ct. 803 (No. 15-485). 
146 Tetzlaff v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (Tetzlaff I), 521 B.R. 875, 877 (E.D. 
Wisc. 2014). 
147 Id. 
148 Brief in Opposition to Certiorari at 6, Tetzlaff, 136 S.Ct. 803 (No. 15-485). 
149 Id. at 6-7. 
150 Id. at 7.  
151 Id. 
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credible.152 Her tests results showed that Tetzlaff was likely 
malingering - he scored extremely high on the portion of the testing 
that indicated he was feigning at least some of his symptoms.153 As the 
trier of fact, the bankruptcy court weighed all testimony and concluded 
Tetzlaff did not establish he was unable to earn more money in the 
future.154 The bankruptcy court concluded that even if Tetzlaff was 
continually unable to pass a bar exam or practice law, he would still be 
able to find work if he put forth some effort.155 The bankruptcy court 
touted Tetzlaff’s educational accomplishments, intelligence, advanced 
degrees, and continued good health, stating: 
 
Even if he is never able to pass a bar exam, he has an MBA, 
is a good writer, is intelligent, and family issues are largely 
over. While he has challenges with past alcohol abuse and 
interpersonal relationships, he is not mentally ill and is able 
to earn a living . . . Mr. Tetzlaff’s marital problems, 
personality problems, misdemeanor convictions, care-taking 
responsibilities, and failure of the bar exams do not meet the 
level of undue hardship necessary to discharge student loans. 
They are typical of many bankruptcy debtors.156 
 
In its discussion of Brunner’s third prong—good faith efforts to 
repay—the bankruptcy court took note of both Tetzlaff’s failure to 
make any payments on the loans at issue as well as the fact that he 
made payments towards a “loan” directly to Florida Coastal.157 
Tetzlaff argued that he made late tuition payments directly to Florida 
Coastal for his law school education, and that the tuition payments 





156 Id. at 7-8. 
157 Id. at 8. 
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should be characterized as payments on a student loan.158 The 
bankruptcy court characterized Tetzlaff as a “malingerer,” and held 
that this did not constitute making a good faith payment on his 
loans.159  
Tetzlaff appealed this decision to the district court, which affirmed 
the bankruptcy court.160 The district court concluded that the 
bankruptcy judge was entitled, as the trier of fact, to weigh and 
discount evidence.161 The district court held “[it could not] upset the 
bankruptcy judge’s finding of no undue hardship, which was 
reasonable given the evidence presented at trial concerning Tetzlaff’s 
effort to find employment.”162 The bankruptcy court’s decision turned 
on its factual findings that Tetzlaff was feigning psychological 
symptoms and not trying to work up to his abilities.163 The district 
court noted that “the bankruptcy court did not, as Tetzlaff claims, 
apply the ‘certainty of hopelessness’ test . . . [T]he bankruptcy judge 
concluded that Tetzlaff had failed to meet even the lesser standard that 




On further appeal, the Seventh Circuit again affirmed the 
bankruptcy court’s conclusion that Tetzlaff had failed to establish 
undue hardship.165 The Seventh Circuit specifically discussed the 
second and third prongs of the Brunner test—since the district and 
bankruptcy courts concluded that Tetzlaff could not maintain a 
                                                 
158 Tetzlaff v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (Tetzlaff I), 521 B.R. 875, 881 (E.D. 
Wisc. 2014). 
159 Id. at 881-82. 
160 Id. at 875. 
161 Id. at 880. 
162 Id. at 881. 
163 Id. 
164 Id. 
165 Tetzlaff v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (Tetzlaff II), 794 F. 3d 756, 761 (7th 
Cir. 2015). 
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minimal standard of living if forced to repay the loans.166 Since the 
bankruptcy court’s findings were findings of facts, the standard of 
review was therefore clear error.167 
When looking at the second prong of Brunner—that there are 
additional circumstances showing a certainty of hopelessness—the 
Seventh Circuit was not persuaded.168 Judge Flaum, writing for the 
unanimous panel, noted that the evidence presented at trial indicated 
that Tetzlaff did not suffer from clinical levels of anxiety or depression 
and that he “may, in fact, be exaggerating his symptoms.”169 The 
Seventh Circuit observed that Tetzlaff’s academic degrees, prior work 
experience, age, and commendable pro se representation in the case, 
all indicated he was fully capable of earning a living and that his 
efforts to maximize his income were insufficient.170 The court justified 
this rationale by stating that undue hardship encompasses a notion that 
the debtor may not cause his own default.171 Instead, the debtor’s 
condition must result from factors beyond his reasonable control.172 
As to the good faith prong of Brunner, Tetzlaff argued that his late 
tuition payments directly to Florida Coastal should count as a good 
faith effort to repay his loans.173 The Seventh Circuit disagreed.174 The 
court criticized Tetzlaff’s argument, holding that the good faith prong 
is centered on the debt subject to the discharge action itself.175 The 
court further opined, “it seems that Tetzlaff repaid his debt to Florida 
Coastal largely because he needed the school’s cooperation in 
releasing his diploma and transcript.176 As a result, the court affirmed 
                                                 
166 Id. at 759-61. 
167 Id.at 759-60. 
168 Id. at 760. 




173 Id. at 761. 
174 Id. 
175 Id. 
176 Id.  
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the lower court’s holding that Tetzlaff did not make a good faith effort 
to pay down his loan debt.177 
 
E. State of the Law 
 
After Tetzlaff, the Seventh Circuit is now one of the most exacting 
circuits when it comes to the undue hardship analysis. Debtors in 
Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin have to conform to the rigidity of the 
Brunner prongs, and prove standards that have intensified since 
Brunner was originally incorporated in Roberson.178 First, a debtor 
must prove he cannot maintain a minimal standard of living if forced 
to repay the loans.179 Second, a debtor must prove additional 
circumstances exist, outside of the debtors control, that would lead to a 
certainty of hopelessness if forced to pay the loans.180 Third, the 
debtor must show good faith in attempting to obtain employment, 
maximize income, minimize expenses, and pay off the loans at issue in 
the adversary proceeding.181 If a debtor is unable to prove all three 
prongs in the original bankruptcy proceeding, the debtor is extremely 
unlikely to win on appeal because of the clear error standard of review 




A. The Seventh Circuit Got Tetzlaff Right 
 
The Seventh Circuit came to the correct conclusion under the 
facts, that Mark Tetzlaff was a malingerer who could not prove that his 
circumstances were outside his control. Now, part of this decision was 
because Tetzlaff was not allowed to disclose expert witnesses who 
                                                 
177 Id.  
178 See Matter of Roberson, 999 F.2d 1132, 1135 (7th Cir. 1993). 
179 Tetzlaff II, 794 F.3d at 758-59.  
180 Id. at 759-60. 
181 Id. at 760-61. 
182 See id. at 759. 
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would testify that he was suffering from memory problems that would 
likely prohibit him from ever passing a bar exam.183 Tetzlaff missed 
the thrice-extended deadline to disclose these experts by eight 
months.184 Under a clear error standard, the Tetzlaff judgment was 
fairly straightforward.  
Tetzlaff’s case would have had the same result had it been decided 
in a totality of the circumstances jurisdiction. Courts applying the 
totality test in the handful of cases that do involve factual 
circumstances similar to this case have had the same result. The Eighth 
Circuit’s decision in Educational Credit Management Corp. v. 
Jesperson is a good example.185 The debtor in Jesperson had previous 
was highly educated, had a J.D., and had just as much debt as 
Tetzlaff.186 Just like Tetzlaff, the debtor in Jesperson was determined 
to be unmotivated to work to his potential, and was denied a discharge 
of his more than $300,000 debt.187 Tetzlaff is also similar to the debtor 
in In re Shadwick.188 Both Shadwick and Tetzlaff have J.D.s, and were 
unable to pass the bar exam.189 Shadwick, however, had three small, 
dependent children, including one with significant disabilities, and was 
still denied a discharge.190 Both Shadwick and Jesperson were decided 
in the Eighth Circuit—the circuit known for using the totality of the 
circumstances test rather than Brunner. 
There is simply no reason to suppose that a circuit employing the 
totality test would find Tetzlaff’s evidence of an undue hardship any 
more persuasive. Tetzlaff was ultimately denied a discharge of his 
student debt because of his failure to work up to his abilities, his lack 
                                                 
183 Id. at 760. 
184 Id.  
185 Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Jesperson, 571 F.3d 775 (8th Cir. 2009). 
186 Id. at 784-85. 
187 Id. at 784-85; see also In re Lofton, 371 B.R. 402, 410-11 (N.D. Iowa 2007) 
(a 43-year-old debtor with three children and two graduate degrees was not 
sufficiently maximizing his income to warrant discharge of this $300,000 debt).  
188 In re Shadwick, 341 B.R. 6 (W.D. Mo. 2006). 
189 See id. at 9. 
190 Id. at 12; see also In re Tyer, 384 B.R. 230 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2008) 
(discharge denied of more than $120,000 to 63-year-old debtor). 
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of significant health issues, his impressive educational achievements, 
the court’s credibility determinations, and the likelihood that he was 
feigning psychological symptoms.191
 
Precisely those considerations 
would have led a court using the slightly different verbal formulation 
applied in the Eighth Circuit to reach the same result. 
 
 
B. The Seventh Circuit Got “Undue Hardship” Wrong 
 
Where the Seventh Circuit erred in the Tetzlaff opinion was in the 
third prong of Brunner—the good faith test. It was not necessary for 
the Seventh Circuit to hold that Tetzlaff’s payments to Florida Coastal 
did not constitute good faith. As discussed above, the court could have 
easily affirmed on the additional circumstances prong alone. In fact, 
this is exactly what the district court did in affirming the bankruptcy 
court before the Seventh Circuit heard the appeal.192 What the court 
has now done is create a landscape where debtors may not be able to 
discharge their loans despite showing strong examples of “undue 
hardship.”193 The Deborah hypothetical from earlier in this Comment 
is an appropriate example. 
To review, Deborah was the debtor who had: an advanced degree, 
difficulty finding employment, and significant loan debt. Deborah also 
had both private and federal loans, with the private loans at a much 
higher interest rate. Deborah is rational; she chose to use her limited 
income to pay off the loans with a higher interest rate first—similar to 
how Tetzlaff paid Florida Coastal for his diploma and transcript so he 
                                                 
191 See Tetzlaff v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (Tetzlaff II), 794 F. 3d 756, 759-
60 (7th Cir. 2015). 
192 See Tetzlaff v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (Tetzlaff I), 521 B.R. 875, 881-82 
(E.D. Wisc. 2014) (“[T]he appropriate characterization of his debt to Florida Coastal 
is irrelevant. . . . even if the bankruptcy judge had viewed the payments to Florida 
Coastal as payments on a student loan, she would have found that Tetzlaff had failed 
[to maximize his income].”). 
193 See Long v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., 322 F.3d 549, 551-52 (8th Cir. 
2003) (where the debtor suffered undue hardship due to a mental breakdown, but 
stopped paying the loans she had been paying for ten years due to her illness). 
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could apply for jobs.194 If Deborah then became ill and lost her vision, 
or had a mental breakdown that an expert could testify was out of her 
control, Deborah would not be able to discharge her federal loans 
unless the Seventh Circuit decides to create an exception from its 
holding in Tetzlaff. While Deborah would be able to prove that her 
circumstances show a certainty of hopelessness, Deborah did not, in 
good faith, pay off the loans at issue in her adversarial proceeding. 
This is wrong. 
The Seventh Circuit, in applying Brunner to the circumstances of 
Tetzlaff’s case, forgot why Brunner was even instituted. The good 
faith prong exists in the first place because Ms. Brunner attempted to 
discharge her loans ten months after graduating without making a 
single payment.195 Now, the Seventh Circuit is confusing the overall 
purpose of section 523(a)(8) with the nuances in applying a test 
designed to encapsulate that purpose. Debtors should not be able to 
discharge their student loans if they merely miscalculated their job 
prospects, or if they made a poor choice in what degree to obtain. 
Debtors should be able to discharge their student loans through 
bankruptcy if they can show that undue hardship will occur if they are 
forced to repay—bar none. That is the language of the bankruptcy 
code, and that is what the Seventh Circuit must apply. With the recent 
holding in Tetzlaff, the Seventh Circuit is now applying a stricter 
standard than the code defines. Multiple factors go into each prong of 
the Brunner analysis, so the holding that a failure to pay the loans at 
issue is now a dispositive factor does not comport with the history of 
the analysis. The Seventh Circuit did not consider the possibility that a 
debtor could have a valid reason for not paying the loan at issue—a 
reason that would still constitute good faith—and it should do so if 
that case appears on the docket. 
 
                                                 
194 See Tetzlaff II, 794 F.3d at 761. 
195 See Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp., 831 F.2d 395, 397 
(2d Cir. 1987). 
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While Mark Tetzlaff may not have been the “perfect plaintiff,” the 
rigidity of the Brunner standard—coupled with the stringent 
applications of Brunner within the Seventh Circuit—creates a situation 
in which people truly suffering from undue hardship will nonetheless 
be unable to partially or fully discharge their student loans. The easiest 
way to solve this in its entirety is for Congress to define what “undue 
hardship” means within the bankruptcy code. However, recognizing 
that this may not happen, the Seventh Circuit should consider stepping 
back from the application of Brunner articulated in Tetzlaff. The 
Seventh Circuit should instead adopt a less rigid standard; a standard 
that gives discretion to the courts to determine what constitutes undue 
hardship without forcing reliance on a single dispositive factor—such 
as a failure to make payments to the loan at issue. 
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